I envision compiler options and code annotations for requesting rules to be enforced. There is not just one definition of 'safety', and we can achieve a variety of kinds of safety through a combination of programming styles, support libraries, and enforcement through static analysis.

For example, the Microsoft Visual Studio analyzer and its memory-safety profile deliver much of the CG support today and any good static analyzer (e.g., Clang tidy, that has some CG support) could be made to completely deliver those guarantees at a fraction of the cost of a change to a variety of novel 'safe' languages.ījarne also complains that in the NSA's document, ''safe' is limited to memory safety, leaving out on the order of a dozen other ways that a language could (and will) be used to violate some form of safety and security.'

In particular, the work on the C++ Core Guidelines specifically aims at delivering statically guaranteed type-safe and resource-safe C++ for people who need that without disrupting code bases that can manage without such strong guarantees or introducing additional tool chains. I have worked for decades to make it possible to write better, safer, and more efficient C++. Bjarne does not consider any of the report's choices for 'safe' languages as superior to C++ for the range of uses he cares about. Guest reader writes: The Open Standards site contains a new paper from Bjarne Stroustrup titled A call to action: Think seriously about 'safety' then do something sensible about it.ījarne reacts to an NSA report about Software Memory Safety since the report excludes C and C++ as unsafe.

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